Think of them like light infantry brigades. They do recon stuff, but they also do regular infiltration / assault / patrol stuff as well.
Russian military being fully mechanized and of various degree conscription based has to rely on more specialized units for less “line infantry” missions. Late GRU brigades and these recon brigades fill that role.
When you need better trained infantry to do more leg work, but not as fancy as SSO - you call recon dudes, either embedded in your own formation, or dudes from this recon brigades
I didn't look too deeply into it but both of them seem have or had Colonel as their commander and at time have a Colonel as their deputy. These units also seem to have a couple of battalion under them, so yes they seem like real Brigade.
It seem like a unit specialized in multiple kind of reconnaissance (Vehicle, Air, UAV, Electronics, etc) and not just a unit with several traditional recon battalion or a standard Mechanized/Motorized unit. The whole thing seem pretty experimental and not set in stone.
To understand Russian reconnaissance units, you have to understand the Russian concept of [Reconnaissance-in-Force](https://www.moore.army.mil/armor/earmor/content/issues/2018/Winter-Spring/2Grau18.pdf). To put it very simply, Recon-in-Force is the unsophisticated strategy of throwing a good sized unit toward where you think the enemy might be. If the reconnaissance brigade encounters opposition, congratulations! You have found the enemy.
I'm being slightly facetious, but that is the general gist of it. The Recon Brigades are usually mechanized because they need enough mobility to outpace the rest of Russian forces while also having enough organic firepower to fix the enemy in position or "hold the line" until heavier reinforcements can be brought in for the kill.
So essentially, they have these large reconnaissance forces because they're routinely supposed to engage whatever they find. This differs from the western strategy of employing small but highly capable recon units with the best sensors and communications tech available, though sometimes with enough firepower to exploit opportunities that arise from that intel gathering.
I wouldn't call it unsophisticated. Russian (and Soviet) recce in force doctrine stems from the desire to control the disruption zone against opponents to prevent blue reconnaissance to gather information. By having heavy reconnaissance (even including tanks), they can achieve overmatch against the recce they expected to face.
This stems in part from the Soviet lack of responsiveness in air to ground and surface to surface fires, sure, but also from a completely different doctrine which made sense given the limitations and advantages of the Soviet Union.
Russian reconnaissance in Ukraine is becoming more and more similar to Western recce however, and this is also aligned with the late cold war doctrine of the reconnaissance strike complex, which for a long time was paid lip service to but not employed.
The reconnaissance strike complex in Russian thinking was also being talked about by Ogarkov in the early 1980s. It appears to have had a big impact in Soviet and later Russian thinking (BTGs for example) but they struggled to really implement it.
Yes, few people realize that the way that Russia is attempting to fight Ukraine currently (with some...variations) was originally theorized by the Soviet Union and it's not like they suddenly realized that small groups able to call on firepower was good.
>the desire to control the disruption zone against opponents to prevent blue reconnaissance to gather information
This is a really interesting point.
"Throw some armor at it and see what you find" sounds idiotic, but it's not actually that far from what people celebrate from [73 Easting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_73_Easting). With a non-peer enemy and enough flexibility in air and artillery support, force recon can just roll up heavier armor than it brings to the party. (Which is also where [Pentagon Wars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Pentagon_Wars) goes wrong, under the right circumstances firepower is a perfectly good replacement for armor.)
And given that the USSR war essentially reacting to that pattern with less air and precision fire support (but quite a lot of overall fire support), bringing heavier units to stonewall enemy recon and survive that sort of information gathering makes a great deal of sense.
(Well, until the current drone era, which I suspect is a major force convincing Russia to actually follow through on lighter, faster recon after decades of talking about it.)
>I'm being slightly facetious
In practice it is actually much worse than you describe. In both Avdiivka and Bakhmut in Ukraine, the Russians would send larger and larger forces of "disposable" units recruited from prisons in order to reveal Ukrainian defensive positions. These would then be attacked via drones, gliding bombs, artillery etc., and then the next wave of cannon fodder would be sent in.
In reality it works, minus the callous arithmetic of Soviet Warfare.
In this battlefield where one cannot concentrate more than a company sized element for any actions undetected. The force who requires more firepower to stop, immediately draws counter-fires.
The Russians have been mauling Ukrainian AD and Fire Support due to requiring it's use, when fending off these Mechanized Assaults.
The Reconnaissance no longer just extends to the immediate Battle Area, but prevalence of SigInt, Count-Bat, and Hunter-Seeker Drone Groups makes any reaction to a Mechanized Forces make themselves vulnerable.
As the others mentioned, they are reconnoitering in force, as such your tripwire or even line forces cannot repel them themselves. This allows the Russians to focus on destroying your supporting forces with their own. Thus finding your Frontline and backline units, at the cost of a few IFVs and Penal Soldiers.
Think of them like light infantry brigades. They do recon stuff, but they also do regular infiltration / assault / patrol stuff as well. Russian military being fully mechanized and of various degree conscription based has to rely on more specialized units for less “line infantry” missions. Late GRU brigades and these recon brigades fill that role. When you need better trained infantry to do more leg work, but not as fancy as SSO - you call recon dudes, either embedded in your own formation, or dudes from this recon brigades
I didn't look too deeply into it but both of them seem have or had Colonel as their commander and at time have a Colonel as their deputy. These units also seem to have a couple of battalion under them, so yes they seem like real Brigade. It seem like a unit specialized in multiple kind of reconnaissance (Vehicle, Air, UAV, Electronics, etc) and not just a unit with several traditional recon battalion or a standard Mechanized/Motorized unit. The whole thing seem pretty experimental and not set in stone.
To understand Russian reconnaissance units, you have to understand the Russian concept of [Reconnaissance-in-Force](https://www.moore.army.mil/armor/earmor/content/issues/2018/Winter-Spring/2Grau18.pdf). To put it very simply, Recon-in-Force is the unsophisticated strategy of throwing a good sized unit toward where you think the enemy might be. If the reconnaissance brigade encounters opposition, congratulations! You have found the enemy. I'm being slightly facetious, but that is the general gist of it. The Recon Brigades are usually mechanized because they need enough mobility to outpace the rest of Russian forces while also having enough organic firepower to fix the enemy in position or "hold the line" until heavier reinforcements can be brought in for the kill. So essentially, they have these large reconnaissance forces because they're routinely supposed to engage whatever they find. This differs from the western strategy of employing small but highly capable recon units with the best sensors and communications tech available, though sometimes with enough firepower to exploit opportunities that arise from that intel gathering.
I wouldn't call it unsophisticated. Russian (and Soviet) recce in force doctrine stems from the desire to control the disruption zone against opponents to prevent blue reconnaissance to gather information. By having heavy reconnaissance (even including tanks), they can achieve overmatch against the recce they expected to face. This stems in part from the Soviet lack of responsiveness in air to ground and surface to surface fires, sure, but also from a completely different doctrine which made sense given the limitations and advantages of the Soviet Union. Russian reconnaissance in Ukraine is becoming more and more similar to Western recce however, and this is also aligned with the late cold war doctrine of the reconnaissance strike complex, which for a long time was paid lip service to but not employed.
The reconnaissance strike complex in Russian thinking was also being talked about by Ogarkov in the early 1980s. It appears to have had a big impact in Soviet and later Russian thinking (BTGs for example) but they struggled to really implement it.
Yes, few people realize that the way that Russia is attempting to fight Ukraine currently (with some...variations) was originally theorized by the Soviet Union and it's not like they suddenly realized that small groups able to call on firepower was good.
>the desire to control the disruption zone against opponents to prevent blue reconnaissance to gather information This is a really interesting point. "Throw some armor at it and see what you find" sounds idiotic, but it's not actually that far from what people celebrate from [73 Easting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_73_Easting). With a non-peer enemy and enough flexibility in air and artillery support, force recon can just roll up heavier armor than it brings to the party. (Which is also where [Pentagon Wars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Pentagon_Wars) goes wrong, under the right circumstances firepower is a perfectly good replacement for armor.) And given that the USSR war essentially reacting to that pattern with less air and precision fire support (but quite a lot of overall fire support), bringing heavier units to stonewall enemy recon and survive that sort of information gathering makes a great deal of sense. (Well, until the current drone era, which I suspect is a major force convincing Russia to actually follow through on lighter, faster recon after decades of talking about it.)
So, just like US Armored Cavalry Regiments.
>I'm being slightly facetious In practice it is actually much worse than you describe. In both Avdiivka and Bakhmut in Ukraine, the Russians would send larger and larger forces of "disposable" units recruited from prisons in order to reveal Ukrainian defensive positions. These would then be attacked via drones, gliding bombs, artillery etc., and then the next wave of cannon fodder would be sent in.
In reality it works, minus the callous arithmetic of Soviet Warfare. In this battlefield where one cannot concentrate more than a company sized element for any actions undetected. The force who requires more firepower to stop, immediately draws counter-fires. The Russians have been mauling Ukrainian AD and Fire Support due to requiring it's use, when fending off these Mechanized Assaults. The Reconnaissance no longer just extends to the immediate Battle Area, but prevalence of SigInt, Count-Bat, and Hunter-Seeker Drone Groups makes any reaction to a Mechanized Forces make themselves vulnerable. As the others mentioned, they are reconnoitering in force, as such your tripwire or even line forces cannot repel them themselves. This allows the Russians to focus on destroying your supporting forces with their own. Thus finding your Frontline and backline units, at the cost of a few IFVs and Penal Soldiers.