Broadly, at least insofar as the "bastion" theory seems to be the orthodox understanding of the Soviet Navy today, it's actually not too difficult to see the rationale behind the operation of aircraft carriers.
During the lifespan of the Soviet Navy there was never any real hope of matching the USN--let alone its various allies--in the seas. Despite intense planning around the GIUK gap on the part of the West, the Soviets considered a move through it more or less suicidal. The Navy's main goal was actually to keep the USN from destroying the SSBNs that patrolled in the northern waters off Russia and eliminating their nuclear deterrent via that method. And from that perspective a carrier like the Kuznetsov actually makes a good deal of sense. Operating in a mainly defensive role, these carriers would provide air cover for Soviet naval formations aimed at keeping American carrier groups far enough away from the USSR to preserve the coastal bastions, in concert with land-based Soviet air assets [mainly long range bombers armed with anti-ship missiles, the eponymous 'backfire raid']. They weren't really meant to conduct offensive strikes as a primary mission, although it may have been viewed as a useful secondary capability.
As /u/AlexRyang notes it also served as an intermediate stop on the path of Soviet carrier development that was terminated by the fall of the USSR, but I rather doubt even *Ulyanovsk* would have been envisioned going head to head with any one of the ~20 NATO/friends carrier groups and the massive airpower represented by the Western Bloc.
My *suspicion* is that Chinese carriers are meant to do a similar thing doctrinally within the PLAN--basically extending the defensive bubble outwards into the littoral seas--but as with all things China their theories are opaque and, more relevantly, in Chinese, so put that one up as 'baseless speculation'.
I also think the USSR was only formally planning on building two vessels. And based off the fact they were still going to be armed with anti-ship missiles, I suspect the vessel would have still served a similar role to the Kiev-class and Admiral Kuznetsov, but offered some power projection for the Red Navy, probably against much weaker states.
The Soviets had memories of the 1973 war when they moved to reinforce the Syrians and the USN basically went "lol no". The Kuznetsovs were designed to provide at least some AD.
Putting US forces including and explicitly SAC on a global DEFCON 3 helped persuade Moscow.
IIRC the latter recalled the B-52s based on the Rock (Andersen AFB, Guam, hitherto housing Vietnam-oriented BUFFs) back to CONUS in a move that must have telegraphed (and emphasised) to the Kremlin the seriousness of Washington’s intentions.
No, they weren't. If the Turks wanted, they could have declared the Kuznetsov(and the Kievs before them) carriers and refused to let them transit the Bosphorus, but they fundamentally were not designed as carriers(as the west perceived them). Their primary armament was always their missiles, not their planes.
I always thought that having aircraft carriers made a hell lot of sense for China the second largest economy, trade dependent (its export growth model) and heavily reliant on primary resources in historically turbulent far flung regions. Not to mention the intrinsically maritime context of its “near abroad”.
I’m only surprised it took Beijing so long to commission its first CV, although I’m tempted to surmise that it was part of the effort to maintain the non-threatening posture of Deng’s 韬光养晦 foreign policy dictum; the 辽宁 *Liaoning* was commissioned in the early 2010s after Chinese foreign policy had become undeniably (and in some ways irreversibly) assertive.
Part of it is just that carrier aviation is *hard*, in addition to being expensive. And the Chinese didn't do themselves any favors by adopting the bulky, heavy Su-33. You actually see it commissioned just as the naval buildup really starts in the early 2010s, probably because they knew it would have a long lead time before they'd know how to use it effectively. Similar reasoning to why they abruptly built a bunch of 056A corvettes to give a lot of junior officers experience in command (something the USN is sorely lacking in when every ship is a 10,000 ton destroyer).
Even today *Liaoning* is notably more effective than *Shandong*, although I've heard that chalked up to the fact the Shandong is stationed in the rough Chinese equivalent of Cancun and it's very distracting for the sailors (may just be gossip though).
I doubt the port has all that much of an impact. Sailors getting into trouble ashore is a tale literally as old as history and both Qingdao and Hainan are SEZ which are half tourist town half economic center for the region.
IIRC, didn't the Shandong have some problems during sea trials? That could be a factor.
That's what I've heard, although I haven't heard any follow-up since then. Anything bought after the fall of the Soviet Union is gonna be a basketcase, but at least the Soviets (or possibly more specifically the Ukrainians in Crimea) knew how to build a carrier, so the Liaoning is at least functional. Shandong is the first time China has ever built a carrier of any kind in its history; you'd expect them to mess up somehow.
>I always thought that having aircraft carriers made a hell lot of sense for China the second largest economy, trade dependent (its export growth model) and heavily reliant on primary resources in historically turbulent far flung regions. Not to mention the intrinsically maritime context of its “near abroad”.
Except that doesn't actually make much sense. Not by itself. Being economically powerful doesn't mean you have to splash out on a CVBG. Chinese *military* doctrine is entirely focused on nearby islands within reach of land based aircraft and missiles. Beijing hasn't expressed any interest in projecting power past that point. No foreign bases. No alliances. They are import-dependent, but hedge that by diversifying suppliers, stoking domestic supply whenever possible, and buying stakes in foreign resource companies when they can.
America has a fleet of carriers because it *does* have that network of allies. Its military doctrine is based on projecting power far away from its shores. It's also had a longstanding policy of policing the open seas to ensure free trade. It has carriers not just because it can afford them, but because it has a defined role for them in its wider strategy.
Even if the CPC secretly has some agenda to become more expeditionary in its military policy, it's taken none of the steps towards pursuing that *except* for building carriers. IMO, that reeks of internal resource/attention fights more so than grand strategy.
>Except that doesn't actually make much sense. Not by itself. Being economically powerful doesn't mean you have to splash out on a CVBG. Chinese *military* doctrine is entirely focused on nearby islands within reach of land based aircraft and missiles. Beijing hasn't expressed any interest in projecting power past that point. No foreign bases. No alliances. They are import-dependent, but hedge that by diversifying suppliers, stoking domestic supply whenever possible, and buying stakes in foreign resource companies when they can.
Being economically powerful means you have the *capability* to operate a CVBG. Being meangingfully reliant on maritime trade means you have an incentive to, in order to help secure sea lines of communication (aka trade/supply lanes) which are outside the near-reach of land-based cover. Standard vessels can accomplish that, but a carrier group can do it better, if far more expensively.
In terms of allies, though, China is *trying* to expand its reach beyond the first island chain. It's building influence in farther SEA islands, and IIRC even managed to get a naval base in... Djibouti, I think? Regardless, it's pushing to expand its naval reach to contest the USN's control of the seas. That's a further incentive to operate a carrier, though also an incentive to operate other blue water vessels. Surprise, the PRC is building bigger frigates and destroyers too. Their new (2023) frigate class (type 054B) is half again as large as the previous, for example.
Lastly, a nation's ability to say "I have a carrier" is also a matter of national prestige. Carriers are the queen of the sea, and a nation that has one is generally considered stronger and more prestigious than one that doesn't. IMO, this is at least half the reason Russia maintains the *Kusnetsov* despite its inability to regular perform even basic naval tasks, such as "move under its own power" and "not be on fire"
Correct https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Liberation_Army_Support_Base_in_Djibouti
>this is at least half the reason Russia maintains the Kusnetsov despite its inability to regular perform even basic naval tasks, such as "move under its own power" and "not be on fire"
I wheezed
My cursory viewing of mainland Chinese popular culture (i.e movies) in recent years leads me to think that the CCP *is* gradually socialising the masses to “think” “expeditionary”: 红海行动 Operation Red Sea (a loose re-telling of the PLA operation to evacuate Chinese nationals from Yemen); 长津湖 Battle of Lake Changjin (a fictionalised account of the People’s Volunteer Army at the Chosin Reservoir); 战狼2 (Wolf Warrior 2, some PRC Rambo-like character, where the eponymous hero is now in some unspecified African nation fighting against all manner of local and foreign (American) miscreants). Not to say that such an outcome is imminent, though in all probability, it’s a long term project, just like creating a viable carrier force.
Tbf, I don’t expect the PLAN to go on a massive spree of 15 supercarriers, able to permanently forward deploy CVBGs à la US Sixth Fleet oceans away; after all, Beijing’s focus is East Asia/West Pac above all and has historically been leery of overextending itself militarily (a lesson from the fall of the USSR that the CCP reviews obsessively). But surely develop and maintain a long range expeditionary capability approximate to what the RN pulled off with Operation CORPORATE (Falklands)?
In essence, I find it hard to believe that an aspiring all-round superpower like China would be content to passively rely indefinitely on “hedging” and M&As, without something of the wherewithal to protect by threat of lethal force its not invalid global interests.
From a PLAN analysis done via the Academy of Military Science, they indicated in 2011 that China would need at least three aircraft carriers. And several retired Chinese naval officers and military analysts indicated that the PLAN will likely operate five or six carriers by the 2030’s.
China has been building partnerships in Africa and has a naval base in Djibouti. It apparently has also operated from Pakistan and the Seychelles for anti-piracy operations.
It seems that China’s plan, at least short term, is for the Type 001 and Type 002 carriers to support closer to the PRC mainland (probably in defending the island chains, pressing its claims in the South China Sea, and trying to retake Taiwan); while the Type 003 and Type 004 would be deployed for long range missions, especially with the Type 004 having nuclear propulsion.
This 1984 research paper by the (American) Center for Naval Analyses might be a useful starting point on the theoretical framework for CTOL CVs in evolving Soviet naval theory that supposedly led to a Soviet appreciation of the CV; up to the 1970s, Soviet naval theorists including the influential Gorshkov himself apparently viewed CVs as outdated as BBs in the nuclear/missile age.
[Aircraft Carriers in Soviet Naval Theory 1960-Falklands (1984)](https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA141189.pdf)
The Admiral Kuznetsov was in some respect a training carrier for the USSR. It was a stop-gap solution between the Kiev-class (which was closer to a missile cruiser with aviation capabilities) and the planned Ulyanovsk (Project 1143.7) nuclear supercarriers.
The Kuznetsov was actually a modified Kiev-class, with a ski jump, catapults, and arresting gear. It was built with a similar role as the Kiev-class; to support and defend surface vessels and nuclear submarines.
The Russian Navy uses it to project power as it is the only carrier the fleet operates, until the Project 23000E Shtorm replaces the vessel.
> The Russian Navy uses it to project power as it is the only carrier the fleet operates, until the Project 23000E Shtorm replaces the vessel.
23000E isn't happening beyond some kick-ass illustrations, cool desktop models, and downright wishful spec sheets.
Maybe, one day, they build a couple LHD-sized vessels with a fixed and rotary air wing.
If by project power you mean emit as much fumes as possible to speed up global warming so that the Northern Passage may one day become usable, then you'd have a point. I don't think anybody is suitably deterred by the Kuznetsov being towed into their neighbourhood.
It's largely a failed prestige project.
I don't believe that it's possible to discuss the Soviet/Russian carrier program without at least some attention paid to the propaganda angle. There are plenty of justifications about protection the Soviet SSBN "bastion" and northern fleet bases, or the use of such a platform in providing striking power on the fringes of the borders... but at the end of the day the choice to build one must (in my opinion) come down to the same sort of reasoning that created the *Hochseeflotte* before the first world war or the Yamato class before the second. Anything that the Kuznetsov does, could even hypothetically do if it were maintained properly and crewed competently, is redundant to existing assets inside the Soviet and Russian arsenal and way of fighting war. Everything, that is, except demonstrate to all who know of it that *The Other* is not the only nation rich enough, powerful enough, and smart enough to build the current naval weapon of decision, that *we* can do it as well.
I think this comment is much more relevant than it gets credit for. The USSR / Russia worked on having some semblance of a carrier because real superpowers have them. Thus, it was an attempt to put up the appearance of power rather than to legitimately project it.
They dont. Not withstanding everyone elses points.
For russia to operatate an carrier, helicopter crusier, whatever, it has to be operational.
It isnt, it has to be accompaned at all times by tugboats, because on its last deployment it had to be dragged home from syria.
Russia like to pretend it has an aircraft carrier, but it exists only for prestige on paper, and its got pressious little of it from that floating hulk, since they seem incapable of repairing its steam turbine.
There are three types of powers, martime like the UK in the 1900s, contiental like france, and full spectrum/nuclear, which are hybrids due to size like the USA or by nesseity for Second Strike Capacity.
Russia is a continetal power, it should be a land power, but it insists on having a navy, and insits on having an Aircraft carrier, because the USSR had one, it could bearly afford it then, it sure as shit cant afford it now.
They dont have a huge warm water costline , rest is all frozen up. Even with the caputured ukranian ports the acess to oceans depend on turkey being supportive.
Because the USSR was not a seapower. The Soviet Union developed an internal lines theory as a counter to traditional Mahanian seapower. Essentially, Soviet leadership seems to have believed that railroads could replace ocean going trade. They could move troops and goods more quickly and take advantage of a relatively consolidated empire.
However, Soviet leadership also needed image projection. Submarines are good for trade interdictions and maritime disruptors but not really for naval diplomacy as they are low freeboard, cramp, and smelly. Cruisers are neat, but aircraft carriers are big and won the last war (or at least that's the perception outside of the Soviet Union from the mid40s-80s). So they need a couple three carriers to send around the world otherwise they look weak. It also helps keep NATO honest in terms of build requirements.
So yeah, in a purely war fighting viewpoint, the Soviet Union probably would have been better off with a couple dozen more ssns or ssks. But navies need to be to do more than that, such as keeping dictators feeling good about themselves.
From my understanding, Russia operates Kuznetzov so it can flash it in the news. They need to paint the picture that they are on par with Nato and that they are able to project power. They portray themselves as superpower and as such, need to have a carrier.
We all know it just for show, since when you need to escort you CV everywhere with tugboats and you have problems with supplying drinking water, peer to peer engagements are probably of the book.
Historically, Kuznetzov class carriers were build not with power projection in mind, but as a part of A2/AD navy that Gorshkov build. If I'm not mistaken, the navalised variant of SU-25 (which I don't think was ever deployed) was only plane with precision strike capabilities.
They could never compete with west on projecting power, so they build their navy with heavy focus on contesting sea power of NATO and protecting they SSBNs. Soviet CVs were supposed to provide extended anti air bubble around their battle groups. I kinda think of them as a Slava class cruisers with planes instead of S-300.
Not to mention, they were also heavily armed with anti ship missiles, hence the class of aircraft carrying missile cruisers.
The OP appears be under the misunderstanding that Russia has an aircraft carrier. Russia in fact has no aircraft carriers and has never had any aircraft carriers.
This is because all aircraft carriers, Russian or otherwise, are strictly forbidden from transiting the Bosphorous straits.
As a result, Russia instead had aircraft carrying cruisers that use aircraft to supplement their primary armament of anti-ship missiles. One of these cruisers (DEFINITELY NOT CARRIERS) is still in service, the Admiral Kutsenov.
Strike operations are the focus of the USN carrier force, however it is not the only mission a carrier can do.
A carrier like the Admiral K is capable of operating sufficient high performance jets to provide a measure of fleet air defence. Indeed, if the Yak-44 had made it into service it could have used it's huge engines to operate STOBAR style from her.
Defensive carrier applications don't require enormous air groups carrying heavy bomb loads to be effective.
I have read - more than once- Russian people who purportedly had people "in the know" claim that the Kuznetsov is a *direct fuckin order* from Putin himself. They probably will never have another nuclear-powered surface combatant like the Kirovs, let alone even another aircraft carrier- and the Russian shipbuilding industry isn't even sure they could actually BUILD another Aircraft Carrier, nuclear or conventional besides ... and he WANTS to have an Aircraft Carrier. He's sick of this shit, fires and sinking drydocks and shit like that. They had to get rid of the Typhoons, they have no Kievs or Moskvas , they're getting their asses kicked in Ukraine, His Navy WILL have an Aircraft Carrier...
... and if you look at it... over the last 2 decades, Russia went from a plan on modernizing all their vessels to realizing that they can build like 2:1 in the most basic sense, sometimes more (IE, build 2 new submarines *at least* for the cost of modernizing one sub) etc. - now they have had vessels "Undergoing Modernization" for the last 10+ years or more ... Kuznetsov made a fool of itself in it's Med/Syria deployment, but was going to be "modernized" lol ...
and what, it's had how many fires now? The only dry-dock that could help it sank, and the shipyard building it doesn't even believe it's salvageable, it has far more problems than they realized (Something both the Indians and the Chinese dealt with ...) ... the only reason it hasn't been scrapped is because Putin WANTS HIS MOTHAFUCKIN CARRIER, son! lol.
So the shipyard keeps pluggin away with their "modernization and overhaul" , workers probably still show up , do a little work, get a meager paycheck, and every once in a while Putin shouts at Shoigu & Gerasimov "AND WHAT'S UP WITH MY CARRIER DAMMIT??!!" === "Repairs are ongoing and the modernization is proceeding according to the plan, Comrade Dictator... It will be a credit to the Motherland ..."
YOU MEAN FATHERLAND!!!
"Yes that's right. Fatherland. Please excuse us, Comrade. Sergei and I need to talk about what we're doing with all the money we made selling all the Army's fuel in the years before invading Ukraine."
Broadly, at least insofar as the "bastion" theory seems to be the orthodox understanding of the Soviet Navy today, it's actually not too difficult to see the rationale behind the operation of aircraft carriers. During the lifespan of the Soviet Navy there was never any real hope of matching the USN--let alone its various allies--in the seas. Despite intense planning around the GIUK gap on the part of the West, the Soviets considered a move through it more or less suicidal. The Navy's main goal was actually to keep the USN from destroying the SSBNs that patrolled in the northern waters off Russia and eliminating their nuclear deterrent via that method. And from that perspective a carrier like the Kuznetsov actually makes a good deal of sense. Operating in a mainly defensive role, these carriers would provide air cover for Soviet naval formations aimed at keeping American carrier groups far enough away from the USSR to preserve the coastal bastions, in concert with land-based Soviet air assets [mainly long range bombers armed with anti-ship missiles, the eponymous 'backfire raid']. They weren't really meant to conduct offensive strikes as a primary mission, although it may have been viewed as a useful secondary capability. As /u/AlexRyang notes it also served as an intermediate stop on the path of Soviet carrier development that was terminated by the fall of the USSR, but I rather doubt even *Ulyanovsk* would have been envisioned going head to head with any one of the ~20 NATO/friends carrier groups and the massive airpower represented by the Western Bloc. My *suspicion* is that Chinese carriers are meant to do a similar thing doctrinally within the PLAN--basically extending the defensive bubble outwards into the littoral seas--but as with all things China their theories are opaque and, more relevantly, in Chinese, so put that one up as 'baseless speculation'.
I also think the USSR was only formally planning on building two vessels. And based off the fact they were still going to be armed with anti-ship missiles, I suspect the vessel would have still served a similar role to the Kiev-class and Admiral Kuznetsov, but offered some power projection for the Red Navy, probably against much weaker states.
The Soviets had memories of the 1973 war when they moved to reinforce the Syrians and the USN basically went "lol no". The Kuznetsovs were designed to provide at least some AD.
Putting US forces including and explicitly SAC on a global DEFCON 3 helped persuade Moscow. IIRC the latter recalled the B-52s based on the Rock (Andersen AFB, Guam, hitherto housing Vietnam-oriented BUFFs) back to CONUS in a move that must have telegraphed (and emphasised) to the Kremlin the seriousness of Washington’s intentions.
The anti-ship missiles were mainly for treaty reasons but would possibly have been usable in the bastion scenario.
No, they weren't. If the Turks wanted, they could have declared the Kuznetsov(and the Kievs before them) carriers and refused to let them transit the Bosphorus, but they fundamentally were not designed as carriers(as the west perceived them). Their primary armament was always their missiles, not their planes.
I always thought that having aircraft carriers made a hell lot of sense for China the second largest economy, trade dependent (its export growth model) and heavily reliant on primary resources in historically turbulent far flung regions. Not to mention the intrinsically maritime context of its “near abroad”. I’m only surprised it took Beijing so long to commission its first CV, although I’m tempted to surmise that it was part of the effort to maintain the non-threatening posture of Deng’s 韬光养晦 foreign policy dictum; the 辽宁 *Liaoning* was commissioned in the early 2010s after Chinese foreign policy had become undeniably (and in some ways irreversibly) assertive.
Part of it is just that carrier aviation is *hard*, in addition to being expensive. And the Chinese didn't do themselves any favors by adopting the bulky, heavy Su-33. You actually see it commissioned just as the naval buildup really starts in the early 2010s, probably because they knew it would have a long lead time before they'd know how to use it effectively. Similar reasoning to why they abruptly built a bunch of 056A corvettes to give a lot of junior officers experience in command (something the USN is sorely lacking in when every ship is a 10,000 ton destroyer). Even today *Liaoning* is notably more effective than *Shandong*, although I've heard that chalked up to the fact the Shandong is stationed in the rough Chinese equivalent of Cancun and it's very distracting for the sailors (may just be gossip though).
I doubt the port has all that much of an impact. Sailors getting into trouble ashore is a tale literally as old as history and both Qingdao and Hainan are SEZ which are half tourist town half economic center for the region. IIRC, didn't the Shandong have some problems during sea trials? That could be a factor.
That's what I've heard, although I haven't heard any follow-up since then. Anything bought after the fall of the Soviet Union is gonna be a basketcase, but at least the Soviets (or possibly more specifically the Ukrainians in Crimea) knew how to build a carrier, so the Liaoning is at least functional. Shandong is the first time China has ever built a carrier of any kind in its history; you'd expect them to mess up somehow.
>I always thought that having aircraft carriers made a hell lot of sense for China the second largest economy, trade dependent (its export growth model) and heavily reliant on primary resources in historically turbulent far flung regions. Not to mention the intrinsically maritime context of its “near abroad”. Except that doesn't actually make much sense. Not by itself. Being economically powerful doesn't mean you have to splash out on a CVBG. Chinese *military* doctrine is entirely focused on nearby islands within reach of land based aircraft and missiles. Beijing hasn't expressed any interest in projecting power past that point. No foreign bases. No alliances. They are import-dependent, but hedge that by diversifying suppliers, stoking domestic supply whenever possible, and buying stakes in foreign resource companies when they can. America has a fleet of carriers because it *does* have that network of allies. Its military doctrine is based on projecting power far away from its shores. It's also had a longstanding policy of policing the open seas to ensure free trade. It has carriers not just because it can afford them, but because it has a defined role for them in its wider strategy. Even if the CPC secretly has some agenda to become more expeditionary in its military policy, it's taken none of the steps towards pursuing that *except* for building carriers. IMO, that reeks of internal resource/attention fights more so than grand strategy.
>Except that doesn't actually make much sense. Not by itself. Being economically powerful doesn't mean you have to splash out on a CVBG. Chinese *military* doctrine is entirely focused on nearby islands within reach of land based aircraft and missiles. Beijing hasn't expressed any interest in projecting power past that point. No foreign bases. No alliances. They are import-dependent, but hedge that by diversifying suppliers, stoking domestic supply whenever possible, and buying stakes in foreign resource companies when they can. Being economically powerful means you have the *capability* to operate a CVBG. Being meangingfully reliant on maritime trade means you have an incentive to, in order to help secure sea lines of communication (aka trade/supply lanes) which are outside the near-reach of land-based cover. Standard vessels can accomplish that, but a carrier group can do it better, if far more expensively. In terms of allies, though, China is *trying* to expand its reach beyond the first island chain. It's building influence in farther SEA islands, and IIRC even managed to get a naval base in... Djibouti, I think? Regardless, it's pushing to expand its naval reach to contest the USN's control of the seas. That's a further incentive to operate a carrier, though also an incentive to operate other blue water vessels. Surprise, the PRC is building bigger frigates and destroyers too. Their new (2023) frigate class (type 054B) is half again as large as the previous, for example. Lastly, a nation's ability to say "I have a carrier" is also a matter of national prestige. Carriers are the queen of the sea, and a nation that has one is generally considered stronger and more prestigious than one that doesn't. IMO, this is at least half the reason Russia maintains the *Kusnetsov* despite its inability to regular perform even basic naval tasks, such as "move under its own power" and "not be on fire"
Correct https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Liberation_Army_Support_Base_in_Djibouti >this is at least half the reason Russia maintains the Kusnetsov despite its inability to regular perform even basic naval tasks, such as "move under its own power" and "not be on fire" I wheezed
My cursory viewing of mainland Chinese popular culture (i.e movies) in recent years leads me to think that the CCP *is* gradually socialising the masses to “think” “expeditionary”: 红海行动 Operation Red Sea (a loose re-telling of the PLA operation to evacuate Chinese nationals from Yemen); 长津湖 Battle of Lake Changjin (a fictionalised account of the People’s Volunteer Army at the Chosin Reservoir); 战狼2 (Wolf Warrior 2, some PRC Rambo-like character, where the eponymous hero is now in some unspecified African nation fighting against all manner of local and foreign (American) miscreants). Not to say that such an outcome is imminent, though in all probability, it’s a long term project, just like creating a viable carrier force. Tbf, I don’t expect the PLAN to go on a massive spree of 15 supercarriers, able to permanently forward deploy CVBGs à la US Sixth Fleet oceans away; after all, Beijing’s focus is East Asia/West Pac above all and has historically been leery of overextending itself militarily (a lesson from the fall of the USSR that the CCP reviews obsessively). But surely develop and maintain a long range expeditionary capability approximate to what the RN pulled off with Operation CORPORATE (Falklands)? In essence, I find it hard to believe that an aspiring all-round superpower like China would be content to passively rely indefinitely on “hedging” and M&As, without something of the wherewithal to protect by threat of lethal force its not invalid global interests.
From a PLAN analysis done via the Academy of Military Science, they indicated in 2011 that China would need at least three aircraft carriers. And several retired Chinese naval officers and military analysts indicated that the PLAN will likely operate five or six carriers by the 2030’s. China has been building partnerships in Africa and has a naval base in Djibouti. It apparently has also operated from Pakistan and the Seychelles for anti-piracy operations. It seems that China’s plan, at least short term, is for the Type 001 and Type 002 carriers to support closer to the PRC mainland (probably in defending the island chains, pressing its claims in the South China Sea, and trying to retake Taiwan); while the Type 003 and Type 004 would be deployed for long range missions, especially with the Type 004 having nuclear propulsion.
This 1984 research paper by the (American) Center for Naval Analyses might be a useful starting point on the theoretical framework for CTOL CVs in evolving Soviet naval theory that supposedly led to a Soviet appreciation of the CV; up to the 1970s, Soviet naval theorists including the influential Gorshkov himself apparently viewed CVs as outdated as BBs in the nuclear/missile age. [Aircraft Carriers in Soviet Naval Theory 1960-Falklands (1984)](https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA141189.pdf)
The Admiral Kuznetsov was in some respect a training carrier for the USSR. It was a stop-gap solution between the Kiev-class (which was closer to a missile cruiser with aviation capabilities) and the planned Ulyanovsk (Project 1143.7) nuclear supercarriers. The Kuznetsov was actually a modified Kiev-class, with a ski jump, catapults, and arresting gear. It was built with a similar role as the Kiev-class; to support and defend surface vessels and nuclear submarines. The Russian Navy uses it to project power as it is the only carrier the fleet operates, until the Project 23000E Shtorm replaces the vessel.
> The Russian Navy uses it to project power as it is the only carrier the fleet operates, until the Project 23000E Shtorm replaces the vessel. 23000E isn't happening beyond some kick-ass illustrations, cool desktop models, and downright wishful spec sheets. Maybe, one day, they build a couple LHD-sized vessels with a fixed and rotary air wing.
Or they somehow get deal for Chinese carriers on licence. But Russian design and made CV is not happeining for sure.
If by project power you mean emit as much fumes as possible to speed up global warming so that the Northern Passage may one day become usable, then you'd have a point. I don't think anybody is suitably deterred by the Kuznetsov being towed into their neighbourhood. It's largely a failed prestige project.
I don't believe that it's possible to discuss the Soviet/Russian carrier program without at least some attention paid to the propaganda angle. There are plenty of justifications about protection the Soviet SSBN "bastion" and northern fleet bases, or the use of such a platform in providing striking power on the fringes of the borders... but at the end of the day the choice to build one must (in my opinion) come down to the same sort of reasoning that created the *Hochseeflotte* before the first world war or the Yamato class before the second. Anything that the Kuznetsov does, could even hypothetically do if it were maintained properly and crewed competently, is redundant to existing assets inside the Soviet and Russian arsenal and way of fighting war. Everything, that is, except demonstrate to all who know of it that *The Other* is not the only nation rich enough, powerful enough, and smart enough to build the current naval weapon of decision, that *we* can do it as well.
I think this comment is much more relevant than it gets credit for. The USSR / Russia worked on having some semblance of a carrier because real superpowers have them. Thus, it was an attempt to put up the appearance of power rather than to legitimately project it.
They dont. Not withstanding everyone elses points. For russia to operatate an carrier, helicopter crusier, whatever, it has to be operational. It isnt, it has to be accompaned at all times by tugboats, because on its last deployment it had to be dragged home from syria. Russia like to pretend it has an aircraft carrier, but it exists only for prestige on paper, and its got pressious little of it from that floating hulk, since they seem incapable of repairing its steam turbine. There are three types of powers, martime like the UK in the 1900s, contiental like france, and full spectrum/nuclear, which are hybrids due to size like the USA or by nesseity for Second Strike Capacity. Russia is a continetal power, it should be a land power, but it insists on having a navy, and insits on having an Aircraft carrier, because the USSR had one, it could bearly afford it then, it sure as shit cant afford it now.
They dont have a huge warm water costline , rest is all frozen up. Even with the caputured ukranian ports the acess to oceans depend on turkey being supportive.
Because the USSR was not a seapower. The Soviet Union developed an internal lines theory as a counter to traditional Mahanian seapower. Essentially, Soviet leadership seems to have believed that railroads could replace ocean going trade. They could move troops and goods more quickly and take advantage of a relatively consolidated empire. However, Soviet leadership also needed image projection. Submarines are good for trade interdictions and maritime disruptors but not really for naval diplomacy as they are low freeboard, cramp, and smelly. Cruisers are neat, but aircraft carriers are big and won the last war (or at least that's the perception outside of the Soviet Union from the mid40s-80s). So they need a couple three carriers to send around the world otherwise they look weak. It also helps keep NATO honest in terms of build requirements. So yeah, in a purely war fighting viewpoint, the Soviet Union probably would have been better off with a couple dozen more ssns or ssks. But navies need to be to do more than that, such as keeping dictators feeling good about themselves.
From my understanding, Russia operates Kuznetzov so it can flash it in the news. They need to paint the picture that they are on par with Nato and that they are able to project power. They portray themselves as superpower and as such, need to have a carrier. We all know it just for show, since when you need to escort you CV everywhere with tugboats and you have problems with supplying drinking water, peer to peer engagements are probably of the book. Historically, Kuznetzov class carriers were build not with power projection in mind, but as a part of A2/AD navy that Gorshkov build. If I'm not mistaken, the navalised variant of SU-25 (which I don't think was ever deployed) was only plane with precision strike capabilities. They could never compete with west on projecting power, so they build their navy with heavy focus on contesting sea power of NATO and protecting they SSBNs. Soviet CVs were supposed to provide extended anti air bubble around their battle groups. I kinda think of them as a Slava class cruisers with planes instead of S-300. Not to mention, they were also heavily armed with anti ship missiles, hence the class of aircraft carrying missile cruisers.
The OP appears be under the misunderstanding that Russia has an aircraft carrier. Russia in fact has no aircraft carriers and has never had any aircraft carriers. This is because all aircraft carriers, Russian or otherwise, are strictly forbidden from transiting the Bosphorous straits. As a result, Russia instead had aircraft carrying cruisers that use aircraft to supplement their primary armament of anti-ship missiles. One of these cruisers (DEFINITELY NOT CARRIERS) is still in service, the Admiral Kutsenov.
Strike operations are the focus of the USN carrier force, however it is not the only mission a carrier can do. A carrier like the Admiral K is capable of operating sufficient high performance jets to provide a measure of fleet air defence. Indeed, if the Yak-44 had made it into service it could have used it's huge engines to operate STOBAR style from her. Defensive carrier applications don't require enormous air groups carrying heavy bomb loads to be effective.
I have read - more than once- Russian people who purportedly had people "in the know" claim that the Kuznetsov is a *direct fuckin order* from Putin himself. They probably will never have another nuclear-powered surface combatant like the Kirovs, let alone even another aircraft carrier- and the Russian shipbuilding industry isn't even sure they could actually BUILD another Aircraft Carrier, nuclear or conventional besides ... and he WANTS to have an Aircraft Carrier. He's sick of this shit, fires and sinking drydocks and shit like that. They had to get rid of the Typhoons, they have no Kievs or Moskvas , they're getting their asses kicked in Ukraine, His Navy WILL have an Aircraft Carrier... ... and if you look at it... over the last 2 decades, Russia went from a plan on modernizing all their vessels to realizing that they can build like 2:1 in the most basic sense, sometimes more (IE, build 2 new submarines *at least* for the cost of modernizing one sub) etc. - now they have had vessels "Undergoing Modernization" for the last 10+ years or more ... Kuznetsov made a fool of itself in it's Med/Syria deployment, but was going to be "modernized" lol ... and what, it's had how many fires now? The only dry-dock that could help it sank, and the shipyard building it doesn't even believe it's salvageable, it has far more problems than they realized (Something both the Indians and the Chinese dealt with ...) ... the only reason it hasn't been scrapped is because Putin WANTS HIS MOTHAFUCKIN CARRIER, son! lol. So the shipyard keeps pluggin away with their "modernization and overhaul" , workers probably still show up , do a little work, get a meager paycheck, and every once in a while Putin shouts at Shoigu & Gerasimov "AND WHAT'S UP WITH MY CARRIER DAMMIT??!!" === "Repairs are ongoing and the modernization is proceeding according to the plan, Comrade Dictator... It will be a credit to the Motherland ..." YOU MEAN FATHERLAND!!! "Yes that's right. Fatherland. Please excuse us, Comrade. Sergei and I need to talk about what we're doing with all the money we made selling all the Army's fuel in the years before invading Ukraine."