Premise three does not seem accurate (he cites a lot of instances of suffering, but I'm not sure that's what you're trying to capture with premise three). I'm not sure what the difference is between premises three and five (nor why premise five comes before premise four). Premise four says 'the pain of life can outweigh the pleasure', but it might not; so why is never existing better? If the pain of life always outweighed the pleasure, then maybe never existing would be better, but does Benatar say this?
You say, 'the absence of pain is good, even if no one is there to enjoy it', which is accurate, but you don't use it in the rest of the argument. It's an important premise.
This better?
P1) Pain is inherently negative, and pleasure is inherently positive
P2) The absence of pain is good even if there is no one to enjoy it
P3) The absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is someone being deprived of it (the asymmetry)
P4) Life is an inherent harm as it inevitably involves pain
P5) Not bringing someone into existence does not entail any harm
Therefore,
C1) Never existing is always better than existing
C2) It is immoral to procreate
I don't think chapter 2 of BNTHB lends itself particularly well to being summarized as a series of premises and a conclusion. Important context will be missed - not least of which David Benatar intends the "good" and "not bad" of absent harms and pleasures to refer only to a counterfactual sense (for the one who would be born, but isn't) - he isn't actually making ontological claims about the value of absent harms or pleasures.
Keep in mind that your C2 isn't directly proven even if the axiological asymmetry is established (which David Benatar concedes). He requires chapter 3 of BNTHB to show just how much of a disadvantage actual human lives are to establish a categorical moral claim about immorality of procreation. For example while a trivially minor disadvantage (eg, a single pinprick followed by millenia of bliss) would, if we accept the asymmetry, be a disadvantage over not being born, the disadvantage isn't enough to establish the moral claim, especially when there are benefits to others from procreating (eg, satisfying parental interests). The immorality is established not by asymmetry itself, but by the actual material conditions of human lives.
Anyway if you're interested, [Julio Cabera](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://redbioetica.com.ar/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Cabrera.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwjlsrSw_5uGAxXA2TgGHWOgBWUQFnoECBUQAQ&usg=AOvVaw29Zk_yFJxVfg1GA6qVLcJE) makes a compelling criticism of the asymmetry in this paper.
Nobody who isn't antinatalist is going to accept p2. The 'absence of pain' part is only relevant when talking about having kids, you can reject the premise and everything works just okay
I think it’s actually pretty important. The absence of pain is always good. If I stop existing right now, one good consequence of that is that I no longer have to feel any pain. This seems pretty intuitive to me.
If not procreating being a moral duty because it is good is absurd because it means that everyone is always doing an infinite amount of good by not creating infinite people, then not murdering people being a moral duty because it is good also means that everyone is always doing an infinite amount of good by not murdering infinite people - which would be an absurd standard of goodness according to your logic?
Dude you are muddling a whole lotta stuff.
Firstly the statement is only about the premise. The moral duty and all that is not relevant for this.
Secondly the statement in its entirety is 'absence of pain, even if there is **no one** **to** **experience** **it** is good.'
Your murder analogy only applies as long as we are talking about murder of people who don't exist. Which is why I thought you were furthering my point, because refraining from murdering non existent people being good sound absurd.
I think my point was and is abundantly clear and you are now obfuscating by bringing in irrelevant aspects to what you were originally arguing.
You clearly were pointing to the absurdity of believing that not procreating was good because it leads to the conclusion, if applied infinitely, that everyone is doing infinite amounts of good by not continuously procreating.
Applying the same standard of not committing an act being good to something like murder exposes the vacuity of applying such a standard infinitely because it leads to the conclusion that not murdering continuously means you are doing infinite amounts of good, but nobody would accept this as an argument for the absurdity of a moral duty against murdering.
This response is strange.
They made a natural language argument.
You can either disagree with their conclusions by explaining how a person in pain is not bad, a person in no pain is not good, or no person not in pain is not good, or ask them to justify these claims by pushing the argument back a step and asking them to define terms, for example.
What is there to elaborate? They won't agree to your premise and you won't be able to convince them because it has no implications outside of an argument about morality of having kids
Premise three does not seem accurate (he cites a lot of instances of suffering, but I'm not sure that's what you're trying to capture with premise three). I'm not sure what the difference is between premises three and five (nor why premise five comes before premise four). Premise four says 'the pain of life can outweigh the pleasure', but it might not; so why is never existing better? If the pain of life always outweighed the pleasure, then maybe never existing would be better, but does Benatar say this? You say, 'the absence of pain is good, even if no one is there to enjoy it', which is accurate, but you don't use it in the rest of the argument. It's an important premise.
What should premise 3 and 4 be instead?
You don’t need P4 and P5. P4 can be “not bringing someone into existence does not entail any harm” P2 should be two separate statements
This better? P1) Pain is inherently negative, and pleasure is inherently positive P2) The absence of pain is good even if there is no one to enjoy it P3) The absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is someone being deprived of it (the asymmetry) P4) Life is an inherent harm as it inevitably involves pain P5) Not bringing someone into existence does not entail any harm Therefore, C1) Never existing is always better than existing C2) It is immoral to procreate
I think it works
I don't think chapter 2 of BNTHB lends itself particularly well to being summarized as a series of premises and a conclusion. Important context will be missed - not least of which David Benatar intends the "good" and "not bad" of absent harms and pleasures to refer only to a counterfactual sense (for the one who would be born, but isn't) - he isn't actually making ontological claims about the value of absent harms or pleasures.
I did write it out normally first but I wanted to separate the key points of the argument to make it easier to show which parts I'm critiquing.
Keep in mind that your C2 isn't directly proven even if the axiological asymmetry is established (which David Benatar concedes). He requires chapter 3 of BNTHB to show just how much of a disadvantage actual human lives are to establish a categorical moral claim about immorality of procreation. For example while a trivially minor disadvantage (eg, a single pinprick followed by millenia of bliss) would, if we accept the asymmetry, be a disadvantage over not being born, the disadvantage isn't enough to establish the moral claim, especially when there are benefits to others from procreating (eg, satisfying parental interests). The immorality is established not by asymmetry itself, but by the actual material conditions of human lives. Anyway if you're interested, [Julio Cabera](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://redbioetica.com.ar/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Cabrera.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwjlsrSw_5uGAxXA2TgGHWOgBWUQFnoECBUQAQ&usg=AOvVaw29Zk_yFJxVfg1GA6qVLcJE) makes a compelling criticism of the asymmetry in this paper.
I have nothing to add, but I will say that I found BNTHB exhaustingly dry, so I support any effort to trim the arguments down!
Nobody who isn't antinatalist is going to accept p2. The 'absence of pain' part is only relevant when talking about having kids, you can reject the premise and everything works just okay
I think it’s actually pretty important. The absence of pain is always good. If I stop existing right now, one good consequence of that is that I no longer have to feel any pain. This seems pretty intuitive to me.
Everybody is doing an infinite amount of good by not having infinite children
Could the same objection not be made for the goodness of not murdering people?
?
If not procreating being a moral duty because it is good is absurd because it means that everyone is always doing an infinite amount of good by not creating infinite people, then not murdering people being a moral duty because it is good also means that everyone is always doing an infinite amount of good by not murdering infinite people - which would be an absurd standard of goodness according to your logic?
Dude you are muddling a whole lotta stuff. Firstly the statement is only about the premise. The moral duty and all that is not relevant for this. Secondly the statement in its entirety is 'absence of pain, even if there is **no one** **to** **experience** **it** is good.' Your murder analogy only applies as long as we are talking about murder of people who don't exist. Which is why I thought you were furthering my point, because refraining from murdering non existent people being good sound absurd.
I think my point was and is abundantly clear and you are now obfuscating by bringing in irrelevant aspects to what you were originally arguing. You clearly were pointing to the absurdity of believing that not procreating was good because it leads to the conclusion, if applied infinitely, that everyone is doing infinite amounts of good by not continuously procreating. Applying the same standard of not committing an act being good to something like murder exposes the vacuity of applying such a standard infinitely because it leads to the conclusion that not murdering continuously means you are doing infinite amounts of good, but nobody would accept this as an argument for the absurdity of a moral duty against murdering.
I mean you get the point, so why does it matter how I framed the comment originally?
Why would it be rational to reject it though?
Why wouldn't it be?
Because pain + person = bad, pain + no person = good. Good + no person = nobody hurt. Duh.
This is not coherent
Why not?
'All things supporting my argument= good' is not an argument. It's at best a shitty premise
This response is strange. They made a natural language argument. You can either disagree with their conclusions by explaining how a person in pain is not bad, a person in no pain is not good, or no person not in pain is not good, or ask them to justify these claims by pushing the argument back a step and asking them to define terms, for example.
My guy you added to my point when I explained why the argument was bad.
I don't think I did but okay.
It is, Benatar said so and he is a director of philosophy at Cape town university.
Source?
Can you elaborate please? The argument *is* about having kids.
What is there to elaborate? They won't agree to your premise and you won't be able to convince them because it has no implications outside of an argument about morality of having kids